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INTRODUCTION
Rice is the most important agricultural product 
in Thailand. It is the main staple for Thai people and its 
contributions to total agricultural production, total 
employment and total export are unsurpassed by other 
commodities. About 70 percent of all families in Thailand 
are still engaged in the agricultural sector, 70 percent of 
which is rice farming. Although Thai exports have become 
increasingly diversified for other crops, such as cassava, 
sugar and maize, rice exports still account for 20 percent 
of the total value of Thai•exports.
A
Since rice is such an important factor in the 
Thai economy, the government has imposed export policies 
for regulating the volume of export to secure an adequate 
domestic rice supply, to prevent fluctuation in world 
prices from affecting domestic prices and to generate 
government revenue. The most important and frequently used 
policy is the rice export premium. There are several 
debatable aspects of the effects of the rice export premium 
on the Thai economy. The major issue is the. distributive 
burden of the export taxes among farmers, exporters, 
domestic consumers and foreign consumers. Rice farmers are 
the single largest economic class in Thailand and on the 
whole they are also the poorest class. Critics of the rice 
premium argue that farmers bear most of the burden of the 
taxes because they believe that the foreign demand for Thai
1
rice is price elastic to very elastic. On the other hand, 
the proponents of the taxation of rice exports who believe 
that the foreign demand for Thai rice is price inelastic 
have argued against that most of the burden is shifted 
forward to foreign buyers.
In order to investigate how the relative burden 
of the rice export tax is distributed, this study tries to 
assess and evaluate the policy's effect on the export and 
domestic price levels as well as the impact of the policy 
on the national welfare. The issue of relative burden of 
the rice export tax is first analyzed in a theoretical 
model using a diagram. The export rice policy is discussed 
and analyzed with an emphasis on the rice export market in 
relation to rice exports, consumption and production. 
Welfare implications of such a policy have also been 
investigated. Second, the issue is presented in an 
empirical study using the econometric model. The model is a 
dynamic simultaneous equation system consisting of domestic 
supply, domestic consumption, export demand, export supply, 
domestic wholesale price, paddy price (the unmilled rice 
price) and the market clearing condition. The model 
quantitatively evaluates the effects of policy variables 
on the exports and the price levels.
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CHAPTER 1
THE WORLD RICE SITUATION
1.1 Trends in consumption
Rice is considered to be the world's principal 
food grain, even though the global production of wheat is 
greater than that of rice. About one-fourth of the wheat 
crop is used for non-food purposes compared with only 7 
percent for rice. Rice is the national food staple in most 
developing countries. Nearly two billion people depend on 
rice for over 80 percent of their diet. China, India and
r
Indonesia together claim almost two-thirds ,of the global 
rice consumed annually, with China alone consuming nearly 
40 percent.
An individual's consumption of a given food 
commodity presumably depends on its price relative to the 
prices of substitute commodities. The other major factors 
which determine total world demand for rice are population 
and real income, or purchasing power of income, and tastes 
or preferences. Besides a population increase and a change 
in and preference in favor of rice, a net increase in real 
income per capita generally will increase total world 
demand for rice.
An overall indicator of the pattern of world rice 
consumption is annual per capita rice consumption. Based on 
rice consumption patterns, countries can be divided into 
three major groups^: habitual consumers, consumers in the
process of changing diet form and bread consumers.
Most habitual consumers live in Southeast and Far 
East Asia and account for the bulk of the world's rice 
consumption. In these regions per capita rice consumption 
is at the highest level 7 rice consumption reaches 130 to 
170 kilograms per capita annually. The demand for rice is
generally inelastic regarding changes in prices and
2 . . .income ; the absolute value of the price elasticity of
demand probably .is below 0.5, indicating the dominance of
3rice and the lack of perceived alternatives .
Consumers in the process of changing their diet 
patterns, e.g., from millet or sorghum to rice, do so 
because of income growth o r .changes in relative prices.
They do not have the well-defined preference of the 
habitual rice eater. Therefore, they can be influenced by 
changes in relative price and income; the absolute value of
the price elasticity of demand for rice could be 1.0 or
4 . . . . .even higher implying that there is much substitution
between rice and other food. This type of consumer may be 
found in West Africa and in parts of Latin America. The 
annual consumption rate is approximately 50 to 7 0 kilograms 
per capita.
The final group of countries are the bread eating 
ones, where rice is eaten occasionally as a special dish.
Annual per capita rice consumption is less than 15
v
kilograms per capita. The demand for rice in these 
countries is not affected greatly by economic factors. It
4
appears that demand for rice is also inelastic for this 
type of consumer. With this condition, changes in price or 
income have little effect on the demand for rice. The 
world's bread regions include Europe, North Africa and 
North America.
Table 1 illustrates the per capita consumption of 
rice for selected countries during four time period. The 
pattern of food consumption shows a shift in favor of rice 
in some countries and little or none in others. The 
quantity of rice demand has increased steadily in China 
and Indonesia, whereas Japan has experienced a steady 
decline in rice consumption. The traditional rice 
consuming countries, such as Thailand, have experienced 
little or no change in their per capita rice consumption.
In the United States, consumption has also increased 
steadily, although varying among ethnic groups.
World rice consumption has increased as a result
of population growth, higher per capita income, increased
domestic production in many countries and low import rice
prices, allowing people in many countries to substitute
rice for coarse grains. Some nations, such as China, India
and South Korea, have increased their own production
because of the consumption increase. In other areas, such
as the Middle East and Africa, rice imports have more than
5 . . . .doubled since the mid-197 0s . Even with declining oil 
revenues in the past few years, most of these countries 
have been able to take advantage of low rice prices,
5
attractive credit terms and food aid programs to maintain 
import and consumption levels.
TABLE 1. PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION OF RICE IN SELECTED 
COUNTRIES. ( in kilograms per year )
Country 1964-66 1974-76 1979-81 1986
Algeria 0.5 0 . 4 1.1 1 . 1
Brazil 51.3 44 . 2 49 . 5 50. 7
China 82 . 6 92 . 7 99 . 6 113.9
Egypt 27.7 36.5 34 . 3 31.8
India 66 . 9 68 . 6 72.5 76 . 6
Indonesia 93 . 7 116 . 8 133.9 145.8
Iraq 13 . 9 24 . 6 34.9 37.8.
Japan 119.4 94 . 9 87 . 4 80.7
Thailand 178.3 180. 2 171.2 163 . 8
United States 5.4 6 . 9 8 . 9 8 . 9
USSR 2.9 5.9 9 . 1 6 . 3
W. Europe 3 . 8 3 . 9 4 . r l 4 . 5
World 51.6 56.2 59 . 9 63 . 7
Source : Rice Outlook and Situation Report. 1986.
1.2 Trends in Production
Rice is grown on all of the continents with the 
exception of Antarctica. World rice production has doubled 
since 1960 and continues to climb. The upward trend in 
production can be attributed to increases in both acreage 
and yield. Since I960, more progress has been made in 
increasing the yield potential of the tropical rice plant, 
than had occurred in the first 50 years of this century, 
indicating that with expanded irrigation systems, new 
higher yielding varieties of seeds, increased fertilizer 
use, and the necessary infrastructure, the rice supply may 
continue to follow the current upward trend and keep pace
with population growth. A number of countries considered to 
be less developed have nevertheless been able to attain a 
higher average rice yield and to improve remarkably their 
rice production over what it was 20 to 30 years ago. Some 
have made rapid progress just during the past decade and 
are continuing to do so, although their yields do not yet 
approach those of Japan or the United States. As can be 
seen in Table 2 and 3, since 1960, harvest areas have 
increased by 20 percent and yields have risen by 65 percent 
However, the rice production has gained only slightly 
compared to population growth since 1950. Thus the 
output per capita has remained rather constant.. In simple 
terms, the future per capita production of rice will depend 
on the land area devoted to the crop, the intensity of 
multiple cropping, the average yields obtained and the 
rates of population growth. Per capita demand will also 
affect the outcome.
Asia has the largest harvested acreage.of rice; 
over 9 0 percent of the world rice supply is grown there. 
China, the largest rice producer, is responsible for about 
4 0 percent of this production. In the future, production 
increases in Asia will come largely from improving yields 
on land already growing rice and from expansion of double 
cropping of the grain . Thailand and Indonesia are the only 
Asian nations which have brought large new areas into rice 
production recently. According to the Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO), during 1974-76 Thailand added over one
TABLE 2. PRODUCTION OF PADDY (ROUGH RICE), BY REGION 
(in thousand metric tons)
WORLD ASIA S. AMERICA AFRICA USA
1965 256479 136386 7853 5647 3460
1966 265125 242821 9079 5856 3856
1967 186528 262789 9038 6668 4054
19 68 288958 264516 8752 6943 4723
1969 301247 276276 9292 6935 4168
1970 3118 3 0 287917 8084 7157 3801
1971 317749 292471 88 8 4 7473 3890
1972 308157 282813 9414 7012 3875
1973 330883 304489 9546 6883 4208
1974 338502 309413 10660 7311 5098
1975 360576 327722 12525 7963 5826
1976 . 349029 318026 11876 7742 5246
1977 3 66071 336230 11411 7959 4499
1978 385737 353066 12212 7848 6087
1979 377394 343590 12414 8279 5985
1980 397597 360876 14449 8400 6629
1981 413785 376232 13258 8 56 2 8408
1982 , 423552 384954 8880 15233- 6969
1983 450049 417469 8912 12423 4523
1984 470284 432559 14570 9107 6296
1985 474728 436366 9417 14447 6120
1986 475533 436562 15323 9847 6097
Source: World Rice Statistics. 1980 and FAQ Production 
Yearbook, 1986
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TABLE 3 . AREA HARVESTED OF RICE AND RICE YIELD
AREA HARVEST (1000 HA) 
1961-65 1979-81 1986
YIELD (KG/HA) 
1961-65 1979-81 1986
World 124126 14367 145358 2040 2756 3271
Africa 3202 4958 5325 1719 1752 1849
Egypt 348 416 412 5307 5707 5947
Ivory Coast 249 461 n . a . 887 1152 n . a .
Nigeria 180 517 700 1178 1975 2023
Zaire 72 236 335 858 8 06 896
South America 4649 7254 6905 1729 1837 2219
Brazil 3809 5932 5590 1607 1436 1860
Columbia 293 424  ^ 333 1965 4350 4905
Asia 114488 128351 130337 2 04 0 2805 3 349
Bangladesh 8955 10310 10320 1680 1952 2350
Burma 4741 4684 4800 1642 2 68 9 3125
China 30953 34323 32948 2780 4244 5372
India 35626 40091 41000 1480 1858 2195
Indonesia 703 6 9063 9 871 1762 3257 3979
Japan 3 281 2384 2303 5012 5581 6322
Philippines 3147 3513 3471 1257 2249 2694
Thailand 69 4 4 8953 9970 1623 1894 1916
Viet nam 4813 5558 5668 2001 2097 2857
Others
U.S.A. 705 1345 963 4374 5167 6330
W. Europe 278 309 3 35 5031 5538 5785
Source: FAQ Production Yearbook, various issues.
9
million hectares of land to its rice-growing areas, most of 
which was rain-fed paddy. Indonesia is developing rice 
lands on its less populated islands, since Java, Madura, 
and Bali are greatly overcrowded and essentially all of the 
suitable rice land on those islands is already planted with 
this crop. Even Thailand is unlikely to bring much new rice 
land into cultivation in the years ahead. Instead it will 
continue to develop its irrigation systems and to depend 
upon double cropping and the use of modern technology to 
increase its rice production. The need for further 
developments of its irrigation system, of course, will be 
true for all Asian rice-growing nations except the few that 
already irrigate all of their rice crop. Since^only one- 
half the Asian crop land, is irrigated, most of the rice 
harvest depends on the critical timing of the Asian 
monsoon. As a result, the rice production in Asia 
fluctuates which causes a substantial instability in 
export availability and price and finally has a significant 
influence on world marketing and trade.
South America is the second largest rice 
producing region in the world, after Asia, with a total of
4.2 percent of the world production in 1986. In South 
America, the low and undependable yield is due to the fact 
that about 82 percent of the continent's land is planted 
with rain-fed upland rice. The data for Columbia, on the 
other hand, show the progress that can be made through the 
widespread introduction, on irrigated land, of the modern
10
rice varieties and new technology.
In Africa Egypt, Madagascar, Nigeria, Liberia, 
Tanzania, Sierra Leone, the Ivory Coast, Zaire and Senegal 
are the predominant rice producing countries. Zaire and
Nigeria exhibited a sizable increase in area of harvested
7 •of rice . In the long run, rice production undoubtedly
will increase in Africa. With their abundant river water
resources for irrigation, these countries have the
potential to become major African rice producers.
In the United States, Europe and Australia, 100 
percent of the rice crop is irrigated, adequate quantities 
of fertilizer are applied, and good farming practices
r-
prevail. The high yields reflect the response to good 
management. Consequently, any future increase in rice 
production in these areas undoubtedly will have to come 
largely from an expansion in land devoted to the rice crop.
The world rice production, though tending to 
increase steadily in the long run, has however, fluctuated 
in the short run. Decrease, when they do occur, are 
largely due to an unfavorable monsoon season which brought 
a long drought period, in addition to other factors such as 
floods, plant disease and the disrupting effect of military 
activities.
Recently, the rice importing countries attempted 
to increase their own rice production in order to decrease 
the amount of food imported and to attain self-sufficiency 
in rice. Exporter countries, especially the developing
11
ones, also attempted to increase production and to export 
in order to earn more foreign exchange. For example, 
Indonesia used the Bimas-Inmas programs to increase its 
production and the Philippines used the Masagana 99 
program. India had experimented with a variety of programs 
designed to stimulate food grain production. In the late 
1970s an exporting country, Burma, launched a similar 
program. Thailand, the main rice exporter, has always been 
eager about promoting rice production. Thus, these 
developments caused world rice production to increase 
rapidly, especially in 1982-86, when world rice production 
increased about 50 million tons.
1.3 Trends in International Trade
There have been some major changes in the trading 
patterns in rice since World War II. The three major rice 
exporters before World War II— Burma, Thailand, and 
Vietnam— no longer dominate the rice trade. Only Thailand 
has retained a significant share of the world market.
Making up for the general decline of these traditional 
prewar exporters are some new entrants in the postwar 
period, most notably Pakistan, the People's Republic of 
China and The United States. There has been a steady and
Q
substantial decline in the role of Asian importers . The 
Asian import share had dropped rapidly as shown in Table 4. 
However, Middle Eastern and Sub-Sahara African rice imports 
have grown more rapidly. As shown in Table 5, the fall in
12
TABLE 4. RICE MARKET SHARE OF RICE IMPORTING COUNTRIES
Net Imports as 
Gross World
a Share of 
Imports.
Region 1961-63 1969-71 1976-78 1978 -80
(percent)
Asian 60. 63 64.2 42 . 2 33.1
Middle East 5.7 6.3 15.8 17 . 5
Sub-Sahara 8 . 1 8.7 16. 5 18 . 3
U .S .S .R and 
Eastern Europe
7 . 0 8.0 7 . 3 8 . 4
Source: The World Rice Market: Structure. Conduct, and
Performance. Siamwalla, Ammar,1983.
TABLE 5. RICE MARKET SHARE OF RICE EXPORTING COUNTRIES
Net Exports as a Share of 
Gross World Exports.
Region 1961-63 1969-71 1976-78 1978-80
(percent)
Asian 64.0 61.6 47.9 57. 3
Central and 
South America 3.5 4.9 7.7 1.2
European 3.2 6.4 3.2 3.7
United States 15.7 21.0 23.3 24.0
Source: The World Rice Marketing: Structure. Conduct, and 
Performance. Siamwalla, Ammar, 1983.
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the Asian export share accompanying with the rise of the 
United States net export share may also be noted.
TABLE 6. THE RICE EXPORTERS BY MAJOR EXPORTING COUNTRIES
(in metric ton)
WORLD THAILAND UNITED STATE: CHINA PAKISTAN
1974 8783659 1046019 1725581 3015101 597204
197 5 8610335 951061 2138747 2740010 477650
1976 9570957 1869453 2106805 2190000 782166
1977 10849525 2931562 2287544 1173165 960164
1978 9685852 1606745 2278778 1677715 776600
1979 11855805 2796868 2300623 1459202 1015012
1980 12712791 274 5061 3054237 1310616 1086641 •
1981 13097312 3027 34 2 3132535 684702 1243665
1982 12188203 3782775 2540345 775863 951028
1983 11487061 3534208 2384789 1087000 904801
1984 12675930 4615730 2141320 1369750 4209120
1985 11124760 4061710 1939970 1045850 .. 2 2 04230
1986 12156440 4523590 2392010 9900'00 3426890
Source:: FAO Trade Yearbook. 1976-1986.
1. Exports Dominated by Few
The export side of the international rice market 
is highly concentrated in four countries: Thailand, United 
States, Pakistan and China. They have a current export 
potential of more than a million tons of rice milled and 
these presently account for three-fourths of the rice 
entering the world market. Table 6 shows that by 1974, 
these four countries were supplying 72 percent of the 8.78 
million tons traded in the world rice market: Thailand 
(1.04 million tons), the United States (1.72 million tons), 
China (3.01 million tons) and Pakistan (0.59 million tons).
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By 1981, total rice exports grew to a record 13.1 million 
tons. The leading exporter was the United States at 3.13 
million tons, followed by Thailand with 3.02 million tons 
and Pakistan with 1.2 million tons. In 1984, Thailand 
reached the record with sales of 4.61 million tons of the 
12.6 million tons of total world rice trade. Thailand is 
still the largest exporter with 24.5 percent of the world 
market share.
2. Rice Importers
Rice is not a highly traded commodity and wiuely 
dispersed throughout the world; therefore, the import side 
of the market is less concentrated, with many countries 
importing relatively small quantities. However, the major 
rice importing regions are concentrated in Asia, Africa and 
the Middle East. These regions account for about 75 percent 
of the world rice trade. Asia is the biggest importing 
region and claims about 50 percent of the world rice 
imports. Since the early 1960s, Africa and the Middle East 
have increased their share of world imports while the 
shares of Asian nations have fallen. Several factors are 
responsible for these changes. First, the development of 
rice production in many Asian countries such as the 
Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Sri Lanka, has 
decreased the quantity of food imported and led to 
self-sufficiency in rice production or even exporting of a 
small amount of rice. Second, rapid rates of income growth
15
and expanding urban populations in the 197 0s pushed up the 
demand for rice in many African and Middle Eastern nations. 
Third, increased urbanization shifted consumption patterns 
from a staple diet of cassava to rice and wheat in African 
and Middle Eastern nations.
1.4 Characteristics of Rice Trade
An characteristic of the rice trade is the 
extreme volatility in the volume traded by each individual 
country. The unpredictability of weather causes the supply, 
and consequently the price to vary greatly from 
year-to-year even when the demand is steadily increasing
A
in line with population growth. Also, the rice market can
be characterized as "thin11 in terms of the small volume of
9trade relative to the variability in supply . Only about 4
percent of the world’s rice crop enters into international
trade as a result of the overlapping of production and
10consumption areas . That so little of the rice produced 
enters the world market implies that the fluctuation in 
production has magnified effects on the volumes traded in 
the world market, making it highly unstable. This 
instability is offset to some degree by the fact that the 
primary fluctuation in production does not lead to an equal 
fluctuation in the volume of rice marketed. Rice producers 
do absorb some of these fluctuations by adjusting to farm 
consumption. About one-third or less of the production 
variation is absorbed by the changes in the farmers1 own
16
11consumption
1.5 Price Structure of Rice
As shown in Table 7 rice is consistently higher 
priced than other cereals such as barley, oats, rye, 
sorghum, millet and wheat. In general, the international 
rice price per metric ton is quoted as two to three times 
higher than the international price of wheat per metric 
ton. The price of wheat is 10 to 45 percent higher than the 
prices of all other cereals.
The year-to-year fluctuation in the price of rice
is followed by similar trends for the price of wheat and ^.
all other cereals; however, the magnitude of price 
increases or decreases may differ. Generally, rice prices 
are more variable than wheat prices because soil and 
climate conditions are not suitable to grow other crops in 
the areas usually associated with rice cultivation. This 
leaves farmers with no other choice, especially in the 
monsoon regions.
While the world price has been relatively stable 
in the long run, it has been very volatile in the short 
run. Fluctuations in the international rice price take 
place because of the fluctuation in international demand 
and supply conditions. The fluctuations in international 
demand and supply are due to fluctuations primarily in 
world production, since world consumption has a stable 
trend.
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TABLE 7. WORLD EXPORT UNIT VALUE OF RICE WHEAT BARLEY AND 
MAIZE ( US$ per metric ton)
RICE WHEAT BARLEY MAIZE
1974 399 171 135 128
1975 374 169 140 136
1976 277 153 138 123
1977 263 125 132 111
1978 346 131 137 117
1979 324 163 14 5 128
19 8 0 383 186 175 128
1981 444 188 175 154
1982 334 173 161 128
1983 302 162 143 143
1984 290 157 147 149
1985 271 145 121 12 5
Source: The State of Food and Acrriculture, 1986.
The major source of supply variability for 
agricultural commodities is the variability in rainfall 
and other production conditions. Weather is a major cause 
of fluctuations in supply and weather-related production 
fluctuation is one of the reasons for a fluctuating price. 
Generally, poor weather conditions have been used to 
explain major production shortfalls and crop failures. 
Since currently most of the world*s paddy is rain-fed in 
lonsoom Asia, the volume of rice traded is particularly 
vulnerable to weather variations such as droughts and 
floods. The cobweb model shows also a reason for price 
variability. For example the high price of rice this 
year leads to a larger production of rice in the next 
year and hence to a low price, but this in turn leads to a 
low supply in the following year, resulting in a high
price.
Another factor that enters into the current 
situation is that virtually all countries have some type of 
government interference with the domestic grain market. In 
many LDCs, government policies are used to manipulate 
prices, with various tax, subsidies, and supports in order 
to raising farm income, lower consumer price and achieve 
government revenue. Farmers and consumers adjust their 
production and consumption in varying degrees to price and 
thus, in the short run, government policies have adversely 
affected market performance and substantially contribute to 
the instability of the rice market.
19
CHAPTER 2
THE THAI RICE SITUATION
2.1 Rice Consumption and Rice Production
Rice is the only staple food in Thailand for the 
entire population, regardless of income level, and it 
accounts for 70 to 90 percent of the daily calorie intake. 
As habitual rice consumers, the domestic demand for rice
is about thirteen to fourteen million tons of paddy or
about 67 percent of the total production as shown in
Table 8 .
TABLE 8 . RICE PRODUCTION AND RICE CONSUMPTION"
( in thousand metric tons )
RICE PRODUCTION RICE CONSUMPTION
1974 9833 6076
1975 8835 6239
1976 10098 6401
1977 9945 6563
1978 9788 6666
1979 11530 6805
1980 10400 6939
1981 11463 7067
1982 11731 7109
1983 11140 7334
1984 12902 7430
1985 13137 7458
1986 13374 7639
1987 12453 7721
Source: Thailand, Ministry of Agriculture, 1987
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TABLE 9. RICE PRODUCTION, PLANTED AREA AND AVERAGE YIELD.
RICE PRODUCTION 
(1000 MT)
PLANTED AREA 
(1000 rais)
AVERAGE YIELD 
(kg/rai)
1960 6770 37909 206
1961 7835 37008 222
1962 8177 38619 231
1963 9279 41618 240
1964 10029 41256 253
1965 9558 40872 256
1966 9078 40961 249
1967 11846 45664 276
1968 9595 40065 274
1969 10772 44681 275
1970 13346 47732 295
1971 13401 48764 3 00
1972 14201 50020 302
1973 12413 51070 293
1974 14899 52270 285
1975 13386 4 9 8 99 268
19 7 6 15300 55602 - 275
1977 15068 53595 281
1978 13921 56444 2 55
1979 17470 62667 313
1980 15758 58971 291
1981 17368 60110 302
1982 17774 59970 312
1983 16879 60134 302
1984 19549 62596 326
1985 19905 62329 331
1986 20264 63422 330
1987 18868 61571 328
Source: Acrricultural Statistics of Thailand , various
issues.
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Rice is grown on nearly 50 percent of the total
12cultivated area which accounts for about 61 million rais
Thai rice production increased by an average of about 2.5
percent per year. As shown in Table 9, the area planted to
paddies increased from 37 million rais in 1960 to 61
million rais in 1987, while the overall yield barely showed
an upward trend. Therefore, the main source of output
growth in these years was achieved almost entirely by
expanding the area of rice planted. However, this situation
has changed since 1975 because cultivatable land resources
have become scarce. Recently, farmers have begun to adopt
13more intensive production techniques on their,farms along 
with the government production policy. However, the rate of 
intensification is considerably slower than in many other 
Asian countries as shown in Table 10. The reason is that 
the High-Yielding Variety seeds need to have plenty of 
water but most of the cultivated areas in Thailand are non­
irrigated fields. Moreover, the unfavorable
fertilizer/paddy price ratio leads to the lower fertilizer 
u s e .
22
TABLE 10. INTENSIFICATION INDICATORS, ASIAN RICE-PRODUCING 
NATIONS
Country
Average
yield
1979-81
Fertilizer 
use(kg/area) 
1980
price
ratio
1977/78
%area 
planted 
to modern 
rice 
1979/80
Rice
irrigation
rate
1975
Bangladesh 1.95 13 1.58 21 13
Burma 2 . 61 18 1.80 29 17
China 4.25 n. a , n . a . n . a . 4 6
India 1. 88 58 3 . 65 47 43
Indonesia 3 .26 102 2 . 04 60 76
Japan 5. 58 330 0. 4 6 n . a . n . a .
Korea(So.) 5.55 228 0.74 56 n . a .
Pakistan 2 . 43 62 3 . 00 50 75
Philippines 2.20 42 3 .25 78 54
Sri Lanka 2 .48 112 1.20 71 92
Taiwan 4 . 62 304 1.3 4 n . a . n . a .
Thailand 1.85 18 3 .35 9
r
n . a .
Source: Thailand: Pricing and Marketing Policy for The
Intensification of Rice Agriculture. World Bank, 
1986.
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2.2 Thai Rice Exports
As rice provides roughly one-fifth of the value 
of Thailand's total exports, rice is considered to be the 
major export product. Both the volume and the value of rice 
exports are expected to increase in the long run. However, 
in some years the volume of rice exports will slightly 
decline as a result of the unfavorable weather-related 
production decrease of paddy.
Thailand exports rice to almost everywhere in the 
world, but the dominant destination is Asia whose major 
importing nations are Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia and 
Indonesia (See Table 11). African is also considered to be 
a main market, particularly for low quality rice. Nigeria 
and Senegal represent major importing countries for this 
region. In recent years, the Middle East has emerged as an 
important market for Thai rice. Europe used to be an 
important Thai rice market, but recently the United States 
has taken away some of the market share.
As shown in Table 12, the world share of Thailand's 
exported rice has fluctuated from 22 percent in the early 
1960's to 16 percent in the early 1970's market share 
rebounded about 3 0 percent in the last few years. The 
significant obstruction in Thailand's rice export is the 
competition among the other exporting nations. The degree 
of competitiveness depends upon the demand for and supply 
of rice in the world market. To stimulate its foreign 
sales, Thailand recently eliminated certain taxes on most
25
rice exports. The government also has begun making long- ' 
term credit Sales of rice to foreign countries and is 
considering barter arrangements to exchange rice for 
fertilizer, pesticide, and other agricultural inputs.
TABLE 12. MARKET SHARE OF THAI RICE EXPORT
(in percent)
YEAR PERCENT
1960-65 21.8
1965-70 16. 3
1970-75 16.2
1975-80 22 . 4
1980-85 29.3
Source: Foreiqn Aariculture Circular Grain
2.3 Exoort Rice Price and Domestic Price of Rice and Paddv
Rice prices in each level--local, Bangkok 
wholesale and export— are all related to each other as 
illustrated in Table 13. The most important domestic rice 
price is the Bangkok wholesale because all other domestic 
rice and paddy prices are based on it. However, the Bangkok 
wholesale rice price depends on the export rice price as 
well as government policies. The export rice prices are 
determined by the demand for and supply of Thai rice 
exports. The world demand for Thai rice is obviously beyond 
control as the world rice market is competitive and
26
Thailand is not a strong market power in the world rice
14market, due to its small share of world production 
Hence, the export rice trade of Thailand principally 
concentrate on supply side rather than on demand side.
The supply of Thai rice exports depends upon the behavior 
of Thai rice exporters, government policies and Thai rice 
production. However, as a rice export leader, export prices 
for Thailand are considered to be indicative of the world 
level15.
The Bangkok wholesale price is related to the 
export price roughly as a result of subtracting the export 
tax from the export price. Once the wholesale price is 
determined, all transaction costs and the profit margin are 
added to the wholesale figure to determine retail price. At 
the same time, paddy wholesalers subtract their cost and 
profit margins from the Bangkok wholesale price in order to 
determine the paddy price. The efficiency price 
transmission process may not always be available to the 
farmer. Too often the farmer has to accept the buyer's 
offer for immediate income to support his family. In 
addition, the farmer is likely to be in debt, perhaps to 
the same person (the money lender) who offered to buy the 
rice. However, the data shown in Table 13 indicate that the 
export market and the domestic market are fairly well 
integrated
27
TABLE 13. THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE EXPORT RICE PRICE 
AND THE DOMESTIC PRICE OF RICE AND PADDY 
( in baht per metric ton )
YEAR NET EXPORT PRICE* WHOLESALE PRICE PADDY PRICE
1974 7902 3757 1936
1975 6497 3782 2104
197 6 4963 4064 1950
1977 5234 4048 1849
1978 6787 4463 2302
1979 6315 4572 2184
1980 8333 5743 2605
1981 10017 6706 3082
1982 6582 5372 2838
1983 6184 5180 2810
1984 5850 4890 28 3 2
1985 5806 4610 2893
1986 5525 4 29 0 2301
1987 5956 5070 2 413
Source: Aqricultural Statistics of Thailand. various
issues.
* Calculated by subtracting the export price from 
the export tax.
2.4 Rice Export Policies
Rice-growing households account for 55 percent of 
the national population and 66 percent of the labor force. 
Moreover, rice accounts for 40 percent of the agricultural 
GDP and about 3 0 percent of agricultural exports.
Therefore, the price of rice is an important determinant of 
the rate of agricultural development, the urban real wage, 
the level of rural welfare, intersectoral labor migration 
and foreign exchange earnings. Therefore, the change of the 
rice price has various effects, not only on the rice 
sector, but also on the other markets. As rice plays an 
important role, the excessive price fluctuations are
28
definitely harmful. As a result, the government always 
tries to intervene in the Thai rice trade, especially when 
the world rice price is highly fluctuating.
There are four different forms of rice export 
policy as follows:
171. Rice export premium
182. Rice export duties
193. Rice export quota
2 04. Rice reserve requirement
The rice quota and the rice reserve requirement
have the same effects on rice as taxes on rice. The reserve
requirement was abolished in 1976. Only three of the
policies had been used until recently. Until 29.86, the
world rice situation was more competitive and the rice
price tended to drop. To stimulate rice exports and keep
Thai rice competitive in the world market, the government
21had eliminated almost all kinds of rice export taxes . In 
1987, Thai rice exporters experienced free trade.
It may be assumed that elimination of the rice
premium will result in a benefit to the Thai economy. Since
foreign demand for Thai rice is elastic to very elastic, 
when the premium is levied, the burden will fall to the 
Thai farmer more than the foreign consumers. As a result 
the domestic rice and paddy prices are forced down. Since 
farmers are responsive to price changes, rice production 
will fall as a result of such a low price, and the farmer's 
income is reduced. On the other hand, the city consumer
29
whose income is considered to be higher than that of the 
farmer, can purchase cheaper rice. Consequently, the rice 
premium is a policy of heavy taxation because its burden is 
carried by the farmer and results in an unfair transfer of 
income from the majority of the poor farmers to the 
minority of relatively wealthy consumers. In terms of rice 
exports, the low price will suppress rice production, which 
in turn will decrease the amount of rice available for 
export. Since the world rice market is competitive, a 
decrease in the quantity of rice exported leads to a fall 
in foreign exchange earnings. However, the supporters of 
the rice premium policy argue that the international and
A
domestic rice market is not competitive. Regarding the 
domestic market if the rice premium is abolished, profit 
will be absorbed by middlemen, and the farmer's price will 
remain low. This assertion rests on their belief that the 
domestic market is not competitive because rice merchants 
take collusive actions. On the international level, they 
view the world market for Thai rice as one of imperfect 
competition and believe that the rice premium caused export 
prices to rise more than when there was no premium. 
Therefore the importing countries paid part of the rice 
premium. These supporters do not deny that the rice premium 
has increased government revenue and has forced down the 
farmers' income by lowering the rice price at the farm 
level. But they assert that farmers are ultimately 
compensated for the loss of income by government-financed
30
development projects, the. diffusion of new farming 
techniques, and the investment in irrigation and road 
construction.
31
CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter concentrates on literature 
concerning the analysis of the Thai rice export sector with 
reference to the government intervention on rice trade.
This chapter involves many previous works which concern 
the Thai rice trade in general, the international rice 
trade and the elasticities of demand and supply of Thai 
rice in the world market, the impact of the rice export tax 
on export and domestic price level and the welfare effect 
of the export tax.
Many aspects of the Thai rice trade have been 
studied extensively. Usher (in Silcock, 1971) gave a 
general view of the rice trade in Thailand, explaining that 
the function of the rice trade is to collect the surplus of 
rice over the farmers' needs, mill and distribute it where 
and when it is needed. He also discussed the channels of 
the rice trade in the topics of rice millings, storage and 
interest charges, transportation costs, ownership, 
retailing and the export trade. As he examined the cost of 
the rice trade as a whole, he found that Thai farmers 
received about 79 percent of the price of rice at Bangkok. 
Pinthong (1978) also examined the internal market structure 
from farm level to Bangkok wholesale level, price 
formation, marketing cost and marketing margin. He observed 
close relationships among the paddy price at the farm
32
level, the rural wholesale price of paddy, and the Bangkok 
wholesale price of rice, which revealed the high efficiency 
of the price transmission mechanism. An increase in the 
Bangkok wholesale price will be fully transmitted to the 
farm, as a result government interference with the domestic 
price will directly make an impact on the farmer's income. 
He also noted the importance of transportation costs, 
margins and other sources of price differences on each 
stage of the paddy and rice trade.
For the international rice trade, Meenaphant 
(1981) provided a description of the structure of 
Thailand's rice sector with an emphasis on the export
r-
market. He discussed and analyzed the Thai rice export 
sector in relation to the government rice trade policies, 
particularly the rice premium policy, in order to measure 
the policy's effect on exports and domestic rice prices. 
.His study indicated that the government trade control 
policy reduces rice export volumes and lowers domestic rice 
prices from the no-intervention equilibrium levels. He 
pointed out that the effectiveness of the policy in 
stabilizing domestic price levels lies in the magnitude of 
export demand elasticities with respect to the export 
price. Thus, the policy is relatively effective only if the 
export demand for Thai rice is highly elastic with respect 
to the export price. On the other hand, the policy is less 
effective when the export price elasticity of demand for 
Thai rice is low. His empirical study revealed the
33
estimated price elasticity of demand for Thai rice at about 
1.07. He concluded that with this low price elasticity, the 
premium policy is likely to be ineffective in insulating 
the domestic rice market from external price fluctuations. 
His work also included the effect on the welfare of the 
rice premium. As a result of the export demand for Thai 
rice being fairly inelastic, the larger share of the 
premium is expected to be paid by foreign consumers. 
Therefore, the rice premium brings a net gain to the Thai 
economy as a whole.
Kruavan (1986) studies the welfare effects of the 
free rice trade policy in Thailand. The results from his 
study show that the free rice trade policy led’'to a larger 
quantity of Thai rice exports, but at lower prices than 
those under government intervention. His study revealed an 
unexpected fall in the domestic price of rice and paddy 
even below the price level under the intervention. 
Therefore, rice consumers benefit the most from the free 
rice trade policy, while Thai farmers are clearly worse off 
Since his study showed a net positive balance in the 
welfare indices, it might be concluded that the Thai 
economy as a whole is better off from the free trade 
policy. However, Kruavan pointed out that this policy 
discourages an expansion of the rice production; thus, it 
would be contrary to the interest of economic development, 
despite the benefits accruing to the consumer sectors of 
the economy.
34
Nakajima (1977) examined the Thai rice export
r
system consisting of four stages as follows:
1. Rice export system with export tax.
2. Rice export system with export tax and quota.
3. Rice export system with export tax and low
v
price forced selling.
4. Rice export system with export tax, low price 
forced selling and release of reserve stocks.
His study showed that when the government 
introduces an export tax, export prices will rise and the 
domestic price will decline; consequently, the quantity of 
exports decreases. However, if the overseas demand for 
Thai rice has a price elasticity of unitary, the value 
amount of rice exports will remain unchanged. In the case 
that the overseas demand for Thai rice increases rapidly, 
the export quota does not allow for an increase in export 
volume and domestic price, but the export price will rise. 
Nakajima notes that the domestic rice price can be kept at 
a certain level by increasing the rate of the export tax. 
However, the government must know in advance where the 
exact point of export price 'level would be; therefore, it 
would be virtually impossible technically, as well as 
institutionally, to adjust the rate of the export tax. In 
order to stabilize the domestic rice price, the export 
quota would be necessary as an effective tool against any 
sudden increase in the overseas demand for Thai rice. He 
viewed that under normal conditions, the export quota is
35
regarded as negligible so that the export tax system, which 
consists of export tax and low-price forced selling, is a 
good institutional tool to benefit the whole economy 
because it generates larger total gains than those in 
a free export system and in an export system with only an 
export tax. The economy benefits because this policy 
allows the export tax and domestic price to be flexible. In 
a system that has only the export tax, an increase in its 
rate will result in a reduction of the domestic price; 
concurrently, the supply of rice will decrease. Thus, when 
the government wants a sizable increase in the revenue from 
the rice export tax, but doesn't want to raise the domestic
r
market price of rice, the export tax only system is 
powerless. On the other hand, the export system which 
includes the export tax and low-price forced selling could 
maintain the domestic price at the same level as in the 
free export system, or even lower, or raise the domestic 
market price. At the same time it also brings an increase 
in tax revenue.
In order to determine the proportion of the tax 
burden and who would bear it, the elasticity of foreign 
demand for Thai rice must be estimated. Therefore, one of 
the important aspects of the Thai rice trade is the 
elasticities of Thai rice demand and supply in the world 
market. Chunantathum (1977) constructed a world demand and 
world supply equations for different grades— high, medium, 
and low quality— of Thai rice and estimated the demand for
36
and supply of Thai rice elasticities in each of the 
different grades separately by using data from the period 
of 1955 to 1972. He found that the supply of Thai white 
rice exports is generally unresponsive to price change.
This inelastic supply response seems to be an important 
factor underlying the wide price fluctuations in rice 
prices for Thai white rice exports, particularly during a 
short run period of one year. For the own-price 
elasticities demand, he observed that high-quality and 
medium-quality rice have higher elasticities than does 
total white rice- Also, the estimates of the elasticities 
of adjustment indicate that the demand for Thai^white rise 
exports is quite elastic in the long run. Thus its long run 
monopoly seems small. He suggests that the policy-maker 
should adjust the premium rate on various grades of rice 
export speedily, in accordance with change in world demand 
and supply conditions.
Wong (1978) developed a model to estimate the 
effects of the rice export tax on trade and welfare o 
Thailand. His analysis shows that the level of 
international price is determined mainly by changes in 
foreign demand, while the volume of rice exports has been 
determined by the size of its exportable surplus at 
prevailing prices. The estimation shows the close 
relationship between the domestic price and the export 
price net of the export premium. This implies that the 
domestic market and the export market are well integrated.
37
Therefore, it is possible that the export premium may 
serve as a tool in insulating the economy from fluctuation 
in the world price. However, the use of the export premium 
as a means to regulate the volume of rice export is 
ineffective, since the export premium could affect 
the volume of exports only by changing domestic 
consumption. The production is given and consumption has 
been shown to be highly price inelastic, so that very 
little change in the exportable surplus could be brought 
about by changing the domestic price. Moreover, when world 
prices are exceptionally low, the export premium becomes a 
heavy tax on the farmer.
r-
The estimated welfare cost of the government's 
taxation of the rice-producing sector is quite high. Wong's 
estimation shows that the premium results in a substantial 
transfer of income from the rice producing sector. 
Therefore, it places a rather unjust burden on the farmer 
and creates a disincentive to increase rice production. The 
probable effects of an elimination of the export premium is 
that the exportable surplus of rice can be significantly 
increased.
The dispute of the rice premium policy has been 
discussed and evaluated by Tsujii (1977). He analyzes the 
influence of the rice export policy on domestic and world 
rice markets theoretically, through the use of a simple 
diagram. He shows the relationship between the quota system 
and the rice premium. When the export quota policy is
38
effective and the rice premium is ineffective, the rice 
premium doesn't influence the export price, the amount 
exported, or the domestic wholesale prices. In this case, 
the excess profits resulting from the quota policy are 
shared by the governments and the exporters. However, if 
only the rice premium is effective, the Thai government 
will receive all the premium revenues and no excess profit 
comes to the exporters.
Tsujii suggested that in the situation of an 
extremely changeable world demand for Thai rice, both the 
rice premium and quota policies should be performed 
together to stabilize the domestic price and assure public 
revenue. He explains that the rice premium alone is not 
sufficient to accomplish policy aims on price and export 
quantities. In order to maintain the domestic price when 
world demand for Thai rice increases rapidly, the rice 
premium alone would require numerous adjustments over the 
short run. Moreover, the exporters are opposed to frequent 
changes of the rice premium because they may have 
difficulty in estimating profits. Also to determine the 
rice premium, the position of the world demand curve for 
Thai rice must be calculated, for which accurate 
estimations are extremely difficult to make. The export 
quota system alone is also not sufficient because all of 
the excess profit that is generated by the quota would 
unfairly come to the exporters. He concludes that the 
simultaneous use of the rice premium and quota with the
39
proper management allows a sharing of excess profit between 
the government and the exporters.
Tsujii argued that the world market for Thai rice 
was imperfectly competitive; therefore, the opponent’s 
argument of the rice premium policy needs to be reviewed. 
Also he cited that the rice premium is borne by both the 
rice-importing countries and the rice-producing farmers; as 
a result, the long-run world demand curve for Thai rice is 
sloped downward to the right. Both supporters and opponents 
agree that the domestic rice price will be forced down by 
the rice premium in the long run. However, he argued 
against the assertion of the supporters that the rice 
producing farmers are not responsive to' the price of rice. 
In conclusion, his analysis of the’ rice premium policy 
disputes the widely approved opinion of the rice premium 
policy's supporters.
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CHAPTER 4 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The purpose of this chapter is to theoretically
analyze Thailand's rice export system through the use of a
simple diagram, using the following assumptions to
. 22facilitate an analysis :
1. The domestic marketing cost of rice is zero; 
t h e r e f o r e t h e  producers' price is equal to the consumers' 
price.
2. Rice exporters are perfectly competitive with 
each other. Other costs such as storage and shipping are 
assumed to be zero. *
3. The export demand for Thai rice is assumed to 
be less than perfectly elastic.
4. The total domestic rice supply is assumed to be 
the surplus of rice over the farmers' need. That is, supply 
is obtained from subtracting the producers' self-consumption 
from total production.
Figure la represents the domestic Thai rice 
market. The domestic supply and domestic demand for rice is 
represented by curve Q and curve C respectively. The 
equilibrium for the domestic market is at point F where the 
domestic supply is equal to the domestic demand and the 
equilibrium rice price is Pd. At that price the country will 
not trade, and therefore zero quantity is shown for the 
export supply in Figure lb. When the rice price rises, the
41
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quantity supplied domestically increases as moving up along 
the positively sloped supply curve, while the quantity 
demanded internally declines as moving along the negatively 
sloped demand curve. The horizontal distance between the 
domestic supply and the demand for rice at each price is a 
quantity of rice export rice at that price. Thus one can 
draw the export supply curve, curve X, as shown in Figure 
lb. By assumption, the foreign demand curve for Thai rice, 
curve M, is sloped downward. If operating under the free 
trade system, the export market equilibrium will be reached 
at point E, where the quantity to export is OQx at the 
export price Px. Since there is no barrier, Px will be the
c
level at which the producer price, consumer p r i c e ■and export 
price of rice coincide. Under an autarky system, the 
equilibrium for the domestic market will be at point F and 
the equilibrium rice price is Pd which is lower than the 
price at the free trade level (Px = Pd'). Therefore, the 
rice consumer will gain under the autarky system due to the 
price decline from Pd' to Pd. This gain is represented by 
the sum of areas a and b, which is the increase in .consumer 
surplus. However, the producer will lose by the sum of areas 
a, b and c, which is the decrease of the producer's surplus. 
Hence, under an autarky system, the Thai economy will have 
the net welfare loss measured by area c which is referred 
to as the "dead-weight loss".
Suppose that trade opens up and the government 
imposes an export tax. For simplicity we deal with a
44
specific duty, say T per unit. Since the vertical axis 
denotes price, the duty can be measured as a T segment on 
that scale. Starting from the intersection of the 
export-supply and import demand curves, we proceed leftward 
to where the vertical divergence between the curves equals T 
in Figure 2b. As a result of the tariff, the export price 
rises to Px' and the domestic price declines to Pd''. The 
difference between the two prices is the tax per unit levied 
by the government; consequently, the quantity of rice 
exports drops from OQx to OQx'. The government revenue from 
the duty equals the volume of export times the tax per unit. 
The tariff is a definite gain to the government, since it is 
collected as revenue by the government. It represents 
revenue that accrues to someone within the country, and this 
gain must be weighed against the consumer gains and producer 
losses from the tariff.
By combining the effects of the tariff on 
consumers, producers, and the government, we can determine 
the net effect of the tariff on the nation as a whole. The 
welfare implication of the rice export tax to each economic 
unit is shown as follows:
The consumption effect of the tariff shows the 
gain to the consumers in the nation that corresponds to the 
increase in their consumption due to the decline of price. 
From Figure 2a, the consumption effect of the tariff is 
equal to the sum of areas a and b.
The production effect of the tariff shows the
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decrease in producer surplus resulting from the tariff. From 
Figure 2a, the production effect is equal to the sum of 
areas a, b, c, h, and i.
The revenue effect shows the gain for the nation. 
Referring to Figure 2b, by imposing the rice export tax, the 
Thai government will gain by the sum of areas d and e.
In short, there is a reduction of a producer 
surplus from the rice farmers by areas a, b, c, h and i, 
only partially offset by a gain in consumer surplus of areas 
a and b and a gain in government revenue collected from the 
domestic citizens of area c and the revenue collected from 
foreigner of area d (shown in Figure 2). This leaves areas
r-
i and h (whose sum*is equal to g) as a deadweight loss; 
the former is the production component of the protection 
cost or production loss which arises because, with the 
tariff, some domestic resources are transferred from the 
production of rice to the other commodities. The latter is 
the consumption component of the protection cost or 
consumption cost which arises because the tariff distorts 
the pattern of consumption.
Therefore, the net welfare for the Thai economy as 
a whole will be the sum of government gain, consumer gain, 
and producer loss. Algebraically, the net welfare gain can 
be written as:
Net gain = Government gain + Consumer gain + Producer loss 
= (d+e) + (a+b) + (-a-b-c-h-i)
*= d+e+a+b-a-b-c-h-i
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= d+e-c-h-i 
because e = c ; h+i = g 
therefore;
Net gain = d-g
If d>g, Thailand benefits from an imposition such 
as an export tax, in so far as the definition of total gain, 
due to producer surplus and government revenue holds.
If the price elasticity of foreign demand for Thai 
rice is unitary, which means that the percentage change in 
the export price of rice is equal to the percentage change 
in the quantity of rice exported, the total gain to the 
economy resulting from imposing an export tax will be the
r-
area QxQx'CE since it holds that:
d-g = PxPx'AB - BCE = QxQx'BE - BCE = QxQx'CE.
One very important determinant of the size of the
net gain or loss is the extent to which the tax is passed on
to foreign buyers, which in turn depends on how responsive
foreign demand is to change in the price charged by the 
exporting country. It is clear that as long as Thailand has 
some influence on the international rice price, which 
implies that the foreign demand for Thai rice is not 
perfectly elastic, there is an optimum export tax which 
would maximize the welfare of Thailand, or the gain in 
government tax revenue at the expense of the importing 
nations minus welfare loss (d-g). This is far from saying 
that any export tax rate would generate a net gain. This net 
gain is necessarily positive at a low rate of export tax,
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but may turn negative at high rates. It can be shown that if 
-the tax is imposed at a rate much higher than is optimal (if 
exports are restricted too much), it may generate a net loss 
to the export country. The size of the net welfare gain or 
loss depends on the elasticities of export demand for Thai 
rice and the domestic supply and demand of rice.
If the welfare of Thailand's rice-importing 
countries is also considered, an imposition of the rice 
export tax in Thailand will induce the welfare loss to those 
nations by the sum of areas d and f which is a reduction of 
consumer surplus in the rice importing countries out of 
which d is collected by the Thai government at the expense
r
of the foreign buyer. By adding the gain to Thailand (d-g) 
and the loss to rice importing countries (d+f), the net 
welfare effect on the global economy is therefore the areas 
f and g, which is the deadweight loss to the global economy.
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CHAPTER 5
THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL AND THE RESULTS FROM ITS ESTIMATIONS
5.1 The Econometric Model of the Thai Rice Sector
Thailand's rice sector econometric model to be 
estimated consists of seven equations, including one 
identity and six behavioral. The model is constructed in 
order to provide a means to analyze quantitatively the 
policy implications of government taxation on rice exports. 
The model to be estimated is as follows:
1. Domestic Supply Equation
PRC>t = a^ + a2APP^. + a^APC^ + a4YLDt + u^
2. Domestic Consumption Equation *
CON. = b n + b.PD. + b,PC. + b.INC '+ b^POP. + u0t 1 2 t  3 t  4 t  5 t 2
3. Rice Export Demand Equation
XTH. = c. + c.PX. + cnUPX. + c.WX. + u_t 1 2 t  3 t  4 t  3
4. Rice Export Supply Equation
XTH. = d n + d 0PX. + d_TX. + d.ER. + u.t 1 2 t  3 t  4 t  4
5. Price Transmission
5.1 Domestic Wholesale Rice Price Equation
PDt = ei + e2PNTt + U5
5.2 Paddy Price Equation
PPj_ = f- + f^PP. _ + f-PD. + u £ t 1 2 t—1 3 t 6
6. Net Return to Exporter
PNT = PXX - TX
The model developed for this study includes two 
groups of variables: first, endogenous variables which are 
generated by the system that the model characterizes;
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second, predetermined variables help to cause the movement 
of the endogenous with inn the system which are the 
exogenous variable plus the lagged endogenous variables. The 
variables used in the model are defined as follows:
The Endogenous Variables
PRO = Domestic rice production, thousand tons.
CON = Domestic rice consumption, thousand tons.
PP = Domestic paddy price at farm, baht per ton.
PD = Domestic wholesale price of rice, bath per ton.
XTH = Quantity of Thai rice export, thousand tons.
PX = Export price of Thai rice, U.S. Dollar per ton.
PXX = Export price of Thai rice, baht per ton.
PNT = Net return to Thai rice exporters, baht per ton.
The Lagged Variables
PPt-1 = Domestic paddy price at farm in the previous 
crop year.
The Exogenous Variables
PC = Price index of food crops except rice, 1980 =
100.
APC = Weighted average price index of food price except 
rice over three years (see appendix A ) .
APP = Weighted average price of paddy over three years 
(see appendix A ) .
YLD = Actual yield, kilograms per rai.
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INC = Per capita income, baht.
POP '=_ Population in Thailand midyear average, million 
persons.
UPX = Export price of U.S. rice, U.S. dollar per ton.
WX = Total volume of world rice export, thousand tons. 
TX = Rice export tax, baht per ton.
ER = Exchange rate, baht per U.S. dollar.
All the equations were estimated using the annual 
data over the period 1974 to 1987. The further definition 
and data source for the variables are given in appendix A.
r
Equation (1) : Domestic Rice Production Equation
The formulation of the supply equation is based on
the assumption of maximum profit of the rice producers. To
maximize their profits, farmers have to make decisions on
the amount of rice acreage to plant. Since crop production
takes time, farmers do not always know for certain the level
of output, nor the prices they will receive for their crop
at planting time. As a result, the decision on the acreage
of rice planted is dependent on the expectation of the price
of the paddy and of other substitute crops. This model
assumes that the farmers make their decision dependent on
the weighted average price of the current year, the previous
23year and that of two years ago
The supply of rice in Thailand is mostly accounted 
for by production and the nature of rice supply in Thailand
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still depends very much on rainfall; the rice yield has, 
therefore, often been varied according to local weather 
conditions. Hence, the yield is included in the model as an 
exogenous control variable.
Equation (2) : The Domestic Rice Consumption Equation
Following the theory of consumer demand, the 
domestic demand for rice is assumed to be a function of its 
own price. However, other factors other such as income, 
prices of the substitute food products and population are 
also considered to affect domestic rice consumption. Given 
short-run effects of habit and tradition, income is an 
important factor governing a level and pattern^ of 
consumption of food as a whole. However, because rice is the 
main part of the Thai diet, the changes in the rice price 
and income may not be able to capture all of the changes in 
the quantity of rice consumed; therefore, a population 
variable is included and is considered to be a dominating 
long-run factor affecting rice consumption.
Equation (3): The Rice Export Demand Equation
The export demand of the Thai rice function is 
treated in a manner similar to the domestic demand such that 
the export demand for Thai rice is constructed as a function 
of the export price of its own price, PX; the export price 
of U.S. rice, UPX; and other explanatory variables such as 
domestic rice production, income level, balance of payment
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situation, and rice import duties of every rice importing 
country. There is no satisfactory way to aggregate these 
different determinants; therefore, the volume of the world 
rice export, WX, is chosen as a proxy for these variables 
because this variable is the result of the interaction among 
these other important determinants of the import demand for 
rice that ultimately affect the demand for Thai rice 
exports.
The demand curve for Thai rice usually slopes 
downward; therefore, the coefficient of PX is expected to be 
negative. The export price of U.S. rice represents the price 
of competing goods, since U.S. rice is considered to be a
A
substitute for Thai rice; thus, the coefficient of UPX is 
expected to be positive. The volume of world exports has a 
positive relationship to the quantity of Thai rice exports.
Equation (4): The Rice Export Supply Equation
In order to maximize profits, the export volumes 
are altered positively to a change in export price and 
negatively to a change in costs of exporting rice, of which 
the major cost is the export tax. Exporters receiving a 
lesser price per unit due to the export tax will export less 
than those without the export tax. Thai rice exports are 
subject to heavy export taxes which should have a depressing 
effect on the rice exported. Moreover, exporters receive 
more domestic currency for their exporting product after the 
devaluation of Thai currency. For this reason the exchange
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rate variable is included in the equation and should have a 
positive relationship to the quantity of the rice export 
supply.
Equation (5): The Price Transmission Equation
There is a difference between the domestic market 
and the world market; the former is subject to government 
regulation and the latter is relatively competitive. Thus, 
it is necessary to link the two market prices in which the 
export tax plays a major role. By historical movement, the 
wholesale rice price often moves in a similar pattern to 
that of the export price. Hence, the domestic wholesale 
price of rice is a function of the difference^ between the 
export price of rice and the rice export tax, PXX - TX, 
which is the net return to the exporters, PNT.
Since the export premium is aimed at stabilizing 
the domestic rice price from the fluctuating export price, 
the rice premium would be raised when international prices 
are high and when domestic production is low. As a result, 
an increase in the export price of rice has no effect on the 
domestic rice price if the export premium is raised just 
enough to compensate for such a change in the export price 
and vice versa. In general, however, the attempt to 
stabilize the domestic price of rice seems not so 
successful. While international prices have shown wide 
fluctuation, changes in the export premium have been rather 
infrequent and not enough to offset these fluctuations.
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Similarly, to link the paddy price received by the 
farmer, and the wholesale price, we have the domestic paddy 
price as a function of the lag paddy price and the domestic 
wholesale price of rice.
5.2 Estimation Procedures and Prediction
The econometric model as constructed belongs to 
the system of simultaneous equations since endogenous 
variables are interdependent. It is impossible to solve for 
any single endogenous variable without simultaneously 
solving all equations. As a rule, Ordinary Least Squares 
estimation of this model will yield biased, inefficient, and 
inconsistent estimates of the structural coefficients. The 
simultaneity bias arises because of the correlation between 
the error terms and some of the independent variables which 
is caused by the simultaneous interaction of all equations 
of the model. The method of Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) 
seems to be favorable because it permits simple 
interpretations, incurs a lower estimation cost and produces 
a good performance. Also the method of Two Stage Least 
Squares provides a mean to purge these independent variables 
of the error components of the structural equations.
In this econometric model, there are seven 
equations and seven endogenous variables; therefore, the 
system is complete and it would be possible to solve the 
model to determine values of these endogenous variables.
Before estimating a system of equations,
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identification of the equations to be estimated should be 
ascertained. Identification is the problem of finding a 
unique solution for the structural parameters from the 
reduced form coefficient. If we cannot identify the 
structural parameters, then the estimation effort will be in 
vain. Therefore, it is obvious that identification is a 
necessary step before estimating the model. In order to use 
Two Stage Least Squares to generate a consistent estimator 
of the parameters in a regression equation, the number of 
endogenous variables that appears as regressors in the 
equation to be estimated can not exceed the number of 
predetermined variables that both appear in the model as a 
whole and are excluded from that equation. The (necessary 
condition for identification of a given structural equation 
says that the number of predetermined variables excluded 
from the given equation is equal to or greater than the 
number of endogenous variables included in the equation 
minus one. Considering the identification problem, each 
equation is overidentified.
5.3 Statistical Results
The parameters of the equations of the model are 
estimated by using the Two Stage Least Squares method and 
the statistical results are presented below. The estimated 
standard errors are shown in parenthesis and t-statistics 
are shown immediately below.
The estimated regressions are :
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Domestic Rice Production Equation
PRO = -3182.25 + 6.309APP - 86.488APC H 
(1265.293) (2.529) (37.580)
-2.515 2.494 -2.301
R-square = 0.9692
Domestic Rice Consumption Equation
CON = +2339.064 - 0.0616PD + 1.854PC + 
(687.705) (0.048) (1.800)
3.401 -1.266 1.030
+ 50.482 PO P + u2 
(34.906)
1.446 
R-square = 0.9945
Rice Export Demand Equation
XTH = -1741.6 - 13.169PX + 5.582UPX + C 
(548.158) (1.659) (2.228) (
-3.177 -7.937 2.505
R-square = 0.9727
Rice Export Supply Equation
XTH = -1519.32 + 4.285PX + 195.403ER - 
(2561.899) (3.091) (99.905)
-0.593 1.387 1.956
R-square =0. 8 1 2 5
4 2.2 66YLD + ux 
(6.259)
6 .752
0.175INC 
(0.082)
2 . 138
.592WX + u3
0.062)
9.403
3.143TX + u4 
(1.493) 
-2.104
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Domestic Paddy Price Equation
PP = -277.791 + 0.495PP. . + 0.316PD +■ u Kt —1 o
(420.805) (0.138) (0.074)
-0.660 3.585 4.243
R-square = 0.8315
Domestic Wholesale Price of Rice Equation
PD = +1733.796 + 0.492PNT + u cb
(471.882) (0.071)
3.674 6.893
R-square = 0.8261
Domestic Rice Production Equation
For the domestic rice production equation the 
estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 
usually accepted level of 5 percent and all of the 
coefficients have the expected signs, a positive for average 
paddy price and yield, and negative for average price index 
of food crops except rice. The short run elasticity 
evaluated at the means is about 0.454754. The estimation of 
the cross-price elasticity of supply is -0.29864. The 
estimate for the cross-price elasticity is low because the 
other crops may not compete significantly with rice.
Domestic Consumption Equation
The domestic rice consumption equation has a high 
R-square. All coefficients have correct signs, but only the
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income variable is statistically significant at 5 percent 
accepted levels. The relationship between the domestic 
consumption and its prices is obviously negative. The per 
capita income, the price index of food crops except rice, 
and the population variable all have positive coefficient 
estimates.
The price elasticity of rice consumption at the 
means of the period is calculated at -0.042711, and the 
income elasticity is at 0.338579. It is therefore suggested 
that the domestic demand for rice is price and income 
inelastic. The fairly low price elasticity and income 
elasticity of less than unitary imply that rice is an
r
important food item in the Thai diet. The cross-price 
elasticity of the demand for rice calculated at the mean is 
about 0.0103296. In a habitual rice-eating country such as 
Thailand, rice is usually the most important item of the 
diet, so it will remain as the basic staple around which 
meals are planned. It seems less probable that, in the 
habitual rice-eating countries, rice will become merely 
supplementary in the way bread or potatoes are in the high 
income countries.
Rice Export Demand Equation
All estimated coefficients have correct signs and 
are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The 
demand for Thai rice shows a negative relationship to the 
export price of Thai rice and positive to the export price
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of U.S. rice. A movement in the world rice export tends to 
alter the quantity of the Thai rice export in the same 
direction.
The price elasticity of the export demand for Thai 
rice calculated at the mean value is slightly above unitary, 
at -1.1772 and being far from infinitely elastic. Therefore, 
it support the basic claim that a part of the rice export 
tax is shifted to foreign consumers and that the cross-price 
elasticity of demand for Thai rice is about 0.627-131, 
implying that U.S. rice, which is considered to be a 
substitute good of Thai rice, is not a significant 
substitute for Thai rice.
r
Rice Export Supply Equation
All estimated coefficients have correct signs, but 
the export price of rice is found to be insignificant. The 
reason may be that the supply of rice is generally inelastic 
to the price change, particularly in the short run. The 
change in premiums is specifically designed to adjust the 
quantity exported to domestic prices. When the export price 
is very high, the government attempts to maintain an 
adequate domestic supply by imposing an export tax. The rice 
export tax, by affecting the cost of exporting, discourages 
the exportation of rice. Therefore, the export supply is 
very much subject to government policy. Moreover, inadequate 
storage facilities restrict the exporters's capacity to hold 
on to the rice in anticipation of better prices.
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The Price Transmission Equations
The domestic wholesale price of rice equation and 
the paddy price equation have a good fit with estimated 
coefficients being significant even at the 1 percent level 
The relationship between the domestic wholesale rice price, 
Pd, and the export rice price net of the export tax,(PX-TX), 
is positive, with elasticity measured at their mean equal to
0.647411. The relationship between the domestic wholesale 
rice price, PD, and domestic paddy price, PP, is also 
positive. The estimated elasticity with respect to the 
wholesale rice price at the means is 1.88429. The 
statistical result confirms our expectation that the export 
and domestic rice markets of Thailand are fairly well 
integrated.
Overall considering that this study analyzes a 
very limited data and information available, the fit of the 
equations must be regarded as fairly good. All the estimated 
coefficients have the expected signs and only a few are not 
significant at the usually accepted levels.
The questions to be considered further are (a) who 
pays the export tax— the rice importing country or the 
exporting country, and (b) what proportion of the tariff is 
to be paid by each nation? These can be best analyzed by 
using the concept of elasticity.
As seen in Table 14, the estimation results show 
that the Thai rice supply is inelastic and imply that rice 
output can not readily be changed when the price is changed,
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TABLE 14. ESTIMATES OF ELASTICITIES AT MEAN
Elasticities
Price Elasticity of Supply 0.45475
Cross Price Elasticity of Supply -0.29864
Price Elasticity of Demand -0.04271
Cross Price Elasticity of Demand 0.01032
Income Elasticity of Demand 0.33857
Price Elasticity of Foreign Demand -1.19080
Cross Price Elasticity of Foreign Demand 
Elasticity of Price Transmission
0.64830
- Domestic Wholesale Price 0.6474 1
- Paddy Price 1. 88429
so a lower price might be accepted to avoid a change in 
quantity. Since the rice premium forces down the domestic 
rice price, the domestic rice producer will bear part of the 
rice export premium. As a result, the more inelastic the 
Thai rice supply, the more of the export tax the Thai rice 
producer will pay. The elasticity of price transmission 
shows that the price information in the market seems to 
transmit very well. A change of one percent in the net 
return to export will cause the domestic rice price to 
change by 0.64711 percent. In the same way, a change in the 
domestic rice price is transferred to the paddy price at the 
farm. A one percent change of the domestic wholesale rice
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price will cause the paddy price to change by 1.88429 
percent. This price efficiency indicates that the market is 
working well by itself. Therefore, the rice export tax which 
depresses the domestic wholesale rice price, has also 
depressed the paddy price at the farm level. Any tax burden 
which can not be shifted to the foreign buyers will be fully 
passed on to the farmer. Furthermore, Thailand's domestic 
demand is also inelastic, and even though the price of rice 
changes a great deal, rice demand will remain relatively 
constant. The larger quantities- will not easily be taken up 
by the local market, so that a small fall in the rice price 
will not induce the domestic market to absorb the quantities
r-
of the rice surplus. As a result,’ the price will fall 
greatly to allow the continued export. If the Thai 
elasticity of the domestic supply and demand is small, 
Thailand will be forced to absorb a larger proportion of 
tax. The elimination of the export tax will raise the 
domestic price. If the domestic rice trade is highly 
competitive, an increase in the domestic rice price will be 
reflected in a higher paddy price; therefore, the farmer 
will benefit from the elimination of the export tax, 
assuming other things are unchanged. It seems reasonable to 
conclude that the domestic paddy market is competitive 
because of the following factors;
1. There are several outlets open to the farmers, 
such as local mills, local middlemen and government 
cooperatives.
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2. There are a large number of each type of buyers 
(except the government cooperative), which means that there 
is horizontal as well as vertical competition in paddy 
trading.
3. There are no legal barriers to new entries into 
the paddy trade. Technical barriers are insignificant, since 
paddy trading is a relatively simple business. Economic or 
financial barriers are not formidable, because both paddy 
trading and paddy milling can be operated on a large or a 
small scale.
4. Expansion of transport and communication 
facilities in recent years has greatly improved the access 
between the farmers and the markets and has helped diffuse 
price information to the farmers.
Considering the world market for Thai rice, if it
is perfectly competitive, the foreign demand for Thai rice
will be infinitely elastic. It means that foreign consumers
are sensitive to price and will avoid paying a higher price.
The quantity forced back onto Thailand would serve to reduce
the Thai rice price; hence, an infinite elasticity of
foreign demand will serve to shift the total export tax
burden backward to Thailand. Under this assumption, a rice
premium is actually a policy of heavy taxation of the
farmers. Nevertheless, the world market for Thai rice is
24imperfectly competitive for, the following reasons :
1. The export price elasticity of the world demand 
for Thai rice, calculated from the econometric model, is
64
slightly greater than one and the demand curve must have a 
negative slope.
2. Thailand is one of the world's largest rice 
exporters, with its share of the world export market at 
approximately 25 percent. Thus, Thailand does have some 
influence on the international rice price.
3. Habitual rice consumers usually have a strong 
preference for a particular type and variety. Thai rice 
attracts a marked preference in some world markets because 
of its high quality, so that an increase in price of Thai 
rice would lead to a slow and gradual substitution toward 
other suppliers rather than being immediately priced out in 
the international market.
Because of the above reasons, the total export tax 
can be split into two portions. One is born by foreign 
buyers in the form of a higher price of rice imported from 
Thailand. The other portion falls into the Thailand's 
economy as a reduction in the domestic price of rice. As a 
result, the export premium generates a burden to the farmer, 
but benefits the domestic rice consumers and generates 
revenue for the government. As the export tax distorts the 
relative prices of commodities and causes allocation 
inefficiencies in production and consumption, there is a 
welfare loss generated in the Thai economy as a whole. 
However, another part of the export tax which is borne by 
foreign buyers represents a gain to the Thai economy. 
Therefore, whether the export tax generates an overall
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benefit to Thailand or not depends on whether the gain at 
the expense of the foreigner is greater or less than the 
losses from resource allocation inefficiencies in Thailand's 
economy.
The welfare effects, as mentioned earlier, can be 
quantified by using the estimate of the parameters of the 
model. The evaluation is done in a roundabout manner 
following these assumptions:
1. The premium rate is divided into two parts: a 
rise in the export price, k, borne by the foreigner, and a
fall in the net export price, (1-k), borne by the Thai
^ 25farmer
r
2. The rise in the export price, k, would rise .by 
5 percent of the export premium. (If Thailand is a small 
producer not expecting to have a strong influence on the 
world price, it is reasonable to assume that the export 
price would rise by no more than 5 percent of the export 
premium.)
3. It is expected that the price to the domestic 
consumer and to the farmer would eventually rise or fall by 
the same amount as the net change in export price. From 
Figure 3, dPP = dPD = (Ta - R) = Ta(l-k).
4. The change in the quantities produced and 
consumed are predicted by using the estimation of the slope 
coefficient of the domestic rice production and the domestic 
rice consumption curve26.
5. The welfare effects are then computed by using
66
Fig
ur
e 
3
c
00
CJ
X
C3f
CO CJ
X
o
CD■a
a)
o o,
CL o CL
or
CM
O
L_O
CJ
<D
LU
U
CL
Q_
O
TJ
CL TDCL
Fig
ur
e 
3a 
Do
me
sti
c 
Ma
rke
t 
Fig
ur
e 
3b 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
M
ar
ke
t
the following formulas:
Producer loss = (Qa - l/2dQa)*Ta(1-k)
Consumer gain = (Ca + l/2dCa)*Ta(1-k)
Government tax revenue = (Xa - d Q a  - dCa)*Ta
assuming
Qa = The average rice production during 1974
to 1987.
dQa = The change in quantity of rice
production.
Ca = The average amount of rice consumed
during 1974 to 1987. 
dCa = The change in quantity of rice
consumption. r
Ta = The average of the rice export premium
during 1974 to 1987.
R = The increase in export price due to the
export premium, thus R = k*Ta where k = 
the rise in export price as a percentage 
of export premium which in this study is 
assumed to be 5 percent.
Ta(l-k) = The change in the net export price which
is assumed to equal the change in the 
domestic price of the consumer and 
producer.
Xa = The average quantity of rice export
during 1974 to 1987.
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TABLE 15
WELFARE EFFECTS OF THE EXPORT PREMIUM, 1974-1987 AVERAGE 
ESTIMATES FROM A 5 PERCENT EXPORT PRICE INCREASE27
(MILLION BAHT)
PRODUCERS LOSS - 2061.797
CONSUMERS GAIN 1376.522
GOVERNMENT TAX REVENUE 338.549
NET WELFARE FOR THAILAND - 346.726
The results indicate that when the export price 
rises by 5 percent of the export premium, the net welfare 
effect to the Thai economy as a whole is negative. That mean 
that the export premium would generally result in a net loss 
for the Thai economy. Even if Thailand were able to exploit 
considerable monopoly power on the world rice market, the 
net gain from doing so would be modest, relative to the 
income transfers imposed on farmers by the price-depressing 
effects of the export premium. This suggests that, although 
foreign demand for Thai rice is not perfectly price elastic, 
the export premium rate has been set higher than it could be 
justified by the optimum rate. The removal of the export 
premium would be a benefit to Thailand.
When the rice premium is levied, it forces about 
an equivalent decrease in both the domestic wholesale rice 
price and the farmers' price. The low rice price would
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benefit rice consumers as well as the industrial sector, 
since it would tend to lower wages. On the other hand, the 
lower rice price causes a lower income for farmers and 
discourages rice production because farmers are responsive 
to price changes. Consequently, the rice premium is actually 
a policy of heavy taxation of the farmers and results in the 
unfair transfer of income from the poor farmers to those 
consumers and industrial users who are relatively better 
off. Moreover, since the Thai economy relies heavily on rice 
production, its decrease can impede economic development. 
Thus, an export premium policy which discourages an 
expansion of rice production would be inconsistent with the 
economic development policy. *
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CONCLUSION
Rice plays a very significant role in the Thai 
economy because rice constitutes a high percentage of the 
national income of Thailand and it is the main diet for her 
people. The highly volatile and widely fluctuating 
international rice price causes a high degree of instability 
in rice exports and domestic rice prices; therefore, the 
government imposes export policies to regulate the volume of 
exports and insulate the domestic price. The effects of 
government intervention in the rice exporting country are 
enormous, involving not only the effect on those in the rice 
export sector but also the farmers, as well as the domestic 
rice consumers. Although such an intervention generated a 
benefit to the domestic rice consumers and the government 
sector, at the same time it results in a substantial 
transfer of income from the poor farmers to other sector.
Due to the controversy over government intervention, the 
purpose of this study is to analyze Thailand's rice export 
sectors, emphasizing the government trade control policy, 
particularly the rice premium policy. An analysis of the 
government intervention was undertaken in order to measure 
and evaluate the policy's effects on exports and domestic 
rice prices. In Chapter three it was found by using a 
theoretical model that the government policy reduces rice 
export volumes and lowers domestic rice prices from the no 
intervention equilibrium level. The magnitude of these
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effects depends upon the price elasticities of production, 
consumption and export demand for Thai rice. The theoretical 
result suggests that the export tax policy is relatively 
effective in reducing the rice export volume and lowering 
the domestic rice price only if the export demand for Thai 
rice is highly elastic with respect to the export price. 
Nevertheless, if the export demand for Thai rice is highly 
elastic, the tax burden shared by foreign consumers would be 
small and the larger share would fall to domestic rice 
producer. This then, in turn, points to the welfare effect 
of an export premium. Whether the export premium increases 
or decreases national welfare depends on how much of it is 
passed on to foreign buyers and how much of it is borne by 
domestic producers in excess of consumer's and government 
revenue's gain. The theoretical analysis concludes that as 
long as the foreign demand for Thai rice is not perfectly 
elastic, there is an optimum export tax that maximizes the 
welfare of Thailand.
The model presented in his study is capable of 
explaining the interrelationships in he Thai rice economy 
and generating estimated values of the elasticities. The 
price elasticity of foreign demand for Thai rice was 
estimated at about -1.1908. Considering this low price 
elasticity, the premium policy is likely to be ineffective 
in insulating the domestic rice market from the fluctuations 
of the international rice price as claimed by the premium 
policy supporters. To quantify and evaluate the effects of
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government policy on rice exports and price levels, a 
dynamic simultaneous model of Thailand's rice sector was 
formulated and estimated by using the Two Stage Least 
Squares regression method over the period of 1974 to 1987. 
Our estimations have shown that there exists a close 
relationship between the domestic price and the export price 
net of the export premium, implying that the export and 
domestic markets are fairly well integrated. The effects of 
the export premium on national welfare were estimated in 
terms of consumers' and producers' surpluses. The signs and 
magnitudes of these surpluses provide a clear indication of 
who benefits and who suffers from the export premium policy. 
In addition, government tax revenues have also been computed 
to determine the net effects of the trade policy. According 
to the results in this study, the effect on the consumer's 
surplus is shown to be positive and that on the producer's 
surplus is negative, clearly indicating that the export 
premium policy brings benefit to the domestic rice consumers 
while the farmers become worse off than before. Although the 
government gains from the export tax revenue, the net 
welfare to the Thai economy as a whole turns out to be 
negative. Therefore, it is concluded that the Thai economy 
would benefit by eliminating the export tax.
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NOTES
1. This grouping follows the pattern given in The 
Southern Rice Industry by Marshall R. Godwin and Linneil L. 
Jones, 1970. However, The Rice Economy of Asia by Randolph 
Barker and Robert W. Hredt, divided the rice consumption 
pattern as: rice and wheat production, rice-dependent 
economies, rice producer and rice-wheat importers.
2. In many rice habitual consuming countries, a 
cost increase may be met by shifts toward purchasing the 
same type of rice but of an inferior and cheaper grade, 
containing a higher percentage of broken grains.
3. See Agricultural Price Policies and The 
Developing Countries. World Bank Publication.
4. See Agricultural Price Policies and The 
Developing Countries. World Bank Publication.
5. From 1962 to 1971, rice imported by the Middle 
East was 352,000 tons annually. But in the next decade, 
total rice imports tripled, to an annual average of 1.2 
million tons. African rice imports followed a similar 
pattern, averaging about 700,000 tons from 1963 to 1971, 
then doubling to nearly 1.5 million tons annually in the 
following decade.
6. The current yields in many Asian nations are so 
low that there is considerable room for improvement.
7. Nigeria increased its rice-harvested area 
dramatically from 180 thousand hectares in the early 1960s
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to 700 thousands hectares in 1986. Zaire increased its rice- 
harvested area from 72 thousand hectares in the early 1960s 
to 335 thousand hectares in 1986.
8. This change is a result of a complex set of
interactions among technological demographic and economic 
factors and the policies of trading nations. In addition to 
attempt to increase rice production, many countries, such as 
the Philippines, Malaysia and Sri Lanka have either switched 
to exporting small quantities of rice or have reduced their 
imports substantially.
9. Siamwalla characterizes a thin market as one 
with relatively high transaction costs because there is no 
central market price for rice and there is difficulty in
access to the world market for the sale of a temporary
surplus.
10. The frequency distribution of the ratio of 
consumption to production for rice is concentrated around 
one which implies that rice is consumed in the country in 
which it is produced.
11. See The World Rice Market: Structure. Conduct, 
and Performance. Research Report 39, International Food 
Policy Research Institute, June 1983.
12. One rai = 0.16 hectare.
13. The adoption of the High-Yielding Variety 
(HYV) of rice has been a relatively recent phenomenon in 
Thailand.
14. See Thailand: Pricing and Marketing Policy for
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the Intensification of Rice Agriculture. A World Bank 
Country Study, 198 6.
15. See Rice Outlook and Situation Report.
October, 1979.
16. Siamwalla argued that the degree of 
competitiveness in the marketing of a crop in Thailand is 
related to the cost of shifting from one buyer to another. 
This cost is related to the nature of the commodity itself 
and to the technology employed in both production and 
marketing. The rice milling industry in Thailand consists of 
a number of small-scale firms that are well dispersed. The 
farmers and various intervening middlemen thus face a 
relatively low shifting cost and do sell to many different 
buyers over the years. Therefore, the Thai farm price is 
closely linked to the Bangkok wholesale price which, in 
turn, is affected by export demand. Thus, in Thailand, the 
price-making forces flow from urban to rural areas rather 
than rural to urban.
17. The rice export premium is a specific tax
levied on each ton of rice to be exported.
18. The rice export duty is an ad valorem tax on
the f.o.b price.
19. The rice export quota is the government 
restrictions on the quantity of rice export. Export quotas 
have been occasionally used along with the rice premium 
since 1957, especially during the period of the rice crisis, 
and was abolished in 1981. However, in 1985, a new export
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quota scheme was introduced which differed from the previous 
quota system. Under this scheme, a private exporter is 
allocated monthly quota, based on the level of his stocks, 
despite of the quantity which was exported by him in the 
past, as in the previous quota system.
20. The reserve requirement ratio is a mandatory 
sale by exporters to the government in the lower price of a 
fixed proportion of particular rice grades for every ton 
exported.
21. Export premiums had already been significantly 
reduce between March 1974 and October 1981 when the fee for 
100 percent white rice was lowered from US$ 250 per ton to 
US$ 17.47 per ton. In October 1983 the premium for all 
grades.of rice was reduced by a further 50 percent and 
remained at that rate until 1984. Also, the export duties 
which were fixed at 5 percent were reduced to 2.5 percent in 
October 1983.
22. See An Economic Analysis of Thai Rice Trade. 
Sorrayuth Meenaphat, 1981.
23. The weights used are 0.5 for the current' 
year, 0.3 for the previous year, and 0.2 for the two years 
ago.
24. See "An Economic and Institutional Analysis of 
The Rice Export Policy of Thailand: With Special Reference 
to the Rice Premium Policy". Hiroshi Tsujii, The Developing 
Economic. Vol 15, pp. 202-220, June 1977.
25. As the world rice market is imperfect
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competition, the foreign demand for Thai rice has less than 
an infinite elasticity; thus, the total export tax can be 
divided into two portions. The larger the price elasticity 
of foreign demand, the less the foreign buyer bear the tax 
burden and the smaller will be the benefit return to the 
Thai economy.
26. See Appendix B.
27. See Appendix B.
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APPENDIX A
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES AND SOURCES OF DATA
All The equations were estimated using annual data 
over the period 1974 to 1987.
APP = Weighted average of paddy price at the farm. 
The weights are 0.5 for the current price, 0.3 for the last 
year's price, and 0.2 for the price of two years ago. The 
paddy price at farm was obtained from Agricultural 
Statistics of Thailand (Ministry of Agriculture), 1975-1987.
APC = Weight average price index of the food crop 
except rice. The weights are 0.5 for the current year, 0.3 
for the previous year, and 0.2 for the two years ago. The 
price index of the food crop, except for rice, was- obtained 
from Agricultural Statistics of Thailand (Ministry of 
Agriculture), 1975-1987.
CON = Domestic rice consumption, in thousand 
metric tons. Data was obtained from the unpublished report 
from The Ministry of Commerce (Bangkok), 1987.
ER = The exchange rate, in baht per U.S. dollar. 
The data was obtained from International Financial 
Statistics (International Monetary Fund), 1987.
INC = Per capita income, deflated by the GDP 
deflator, in baht. Data was obtain from International 
Financial Statistics (International Monetary Fund), 1987.
PD = The domestic wholesale rice price, in bath 
Data was obtained from Journal of Business Economics
79
(Division of Business Economics, Ministry of Commerce, 
Bangkok), 1983.
POP = Population in Thailand, midyear average, 
million persons. Data was obtained from International 
Financial Statistics (International Monetary Fund), 1987.
PP = The paddy price at farm, in baht. Data was 
obtained from Agricultural Statistics of Thailand (Ministry 
of Agriculture), 1975-1987.
PRO = The quantity of paddy production, in milled 
equivalent, in thousand metric tons. Data was obtained by 
multiplying the quantity of paddy production by a constant 
conversion factor of 0.66. Data on paddy production was 
obtained from Agricultural Statistics of Thailand,
1975-1987.
PX = Export price of Thai rice, in U.S. dollar. 
Data was obtained from International Financial Statistics 
(International Monetary Fund), 1987.
PNT = Net return to Thai rice exporters, in baht. 
Data was calculated by converting the export price of Thai 
rice from U.S. dollars into bahts and then subtracting the 
average rice export taxes.
TX = The average rice export taxes, in baths. Data 
was calculated by dividing the total rice export tax revenue 
collected each year with the quantity of rice exported in 
that year. The tax revenue data was obtained from Journal of 
Business Economics (Division of Business Economics, Ministry 
of Commerce, Bangkok), 1983 and from the unpublished report
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from The Ministry of Commerce for 1984-1987.
XTH = The quantity of Thai rice exports, in 
thousand metric tons. Data was obtained from FAQ Trade 
Yearbook (The United Nation), 1970-1987.
UPX = Export price of U.S. rice, in U.S. dollars. 
Data was obtained from International Financial Statistics 
(International Monetary Fund), 1987.
WX = Total world export, thousand tons. Data was 
obtained from FAQ Trade Yearbook (The United Nation), 1970-
1987 .
YLD = Yield per rai, in kilograms. Data was 
obtained from Agricultural Statistics of Thailand (Ministry 
of Agriculture), 1975-1987.
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APPENDIX B
THE WELFARE EFFECT OF THE EXPORT PREMIUM
Since the premium rate, prices and quantities have 
shown considerable variations during the period of study, 
the welfare effects are then evaluated by using the average 
value of these variables for the period of 1974 to 1987. The 
figure of the average value of each variable is shown as 
follows:
Average value of production (Qa) = 9811.55 thousand tons
Average value of consumption (Ca) = 6080.86 thousand tons
Average value of rice export (Xa) = 2864.43 thousand tons
Average value of rice export tax (Ta) = 238.59 baht per ton 
The change in quantity produced and consumed is
*
predicted by using the estimates of the slope coefficients 
of the domestic supply and demand. Therefore, the change in 
the quantity of rice produced can be computed as follow: 
dPP/dQa = slope of production curve.
dQa = coefficient estimate of price in
production equation*dPP
assuming that
dQa = the change in quantity produced.
dPP = the change in paddy price,
since, dPP = Ta(l-k) ; as it is expected that the
price to the domestic consumer and to the farmer would rise 
or fall by the same amount of the change in the net export 
price, assuming that k is the rise in export price as a
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percentage of the export premium. For this study, assume k = 
5 percent. Therefore, (1— k) is the fall in the net export 
price as a percentage of the export premium, 
thus
dQa = coefficient*Ta(1-k)
= 6.30918*238.59(1-0.05)
= 1430.02
In a similar way, the change in quantity consumed
will be:
dCa = coefficient of consumption curve*dPD
since, dPD = dPP = Ta(l-k)
thus: dCa = slope coefficient*Ta(1-k)
= 0.06161*2 38.5 9(1-0.05)
= -13.967
Now, the welfare effects can be computed. The 
result of the welfare indicators are shown as follow: 
Producer Loss(PL) = (Qa - l/2dQa)*Ta(1-k)
= - 2 061.797
Consumer Gain(CG) = (Ca + l/2dCa)*Ta(1-k)
= + 1376.552
Government Tax Revenue(GTR) = (Xa - dQa - dCa)*Ta
= + 338.549 
Net Welfare for Thailand = PL + CG + GTR
= -2061.797 + 1376.552 + 338.549 
= - 346.726
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